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ABSTRACT: NASA performed testing to evaluate the efficacy of fire containment boxes without 
forced ventilation. Configurational flammability testing was performed on a simulation avionics box 
replicating critical design features and filled with materials possessing representative flammability 
characteristics. This paper discusses the box’s ability, under simulated end-use conditions, to inhibit 
the propagation of combustion to surrounding materials. Analysis was also performed to evaluate the 
potential for the fire containment box to serve as an overheat/ignition source to temperature sensitive 
equipment (such as items with lithium-ion batteries). Unrealistically severe combustion scenarios 
were used as a means to better understand the fire containment mechanism. These scenarios were 
achieved by utilizing materials/fuels not typically used in space vehicles due to flammability 
concerns. Oxygen depletion, during combustion within the fire containment boxes, drove 
self-extinguishment and proved an effective method of fire containment. 
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Background 
 
Flight avionics boxes are used with a wide range of applications throughout the International 
Space Station (ISS) cabin. Avionics boxes are an efficient means of containing required 
materials within an enclosure. Beyond the specific avionics box application, containment boxes 
may also be considered as a potential strategy for isolating possible flammable materials in 
general.  
     NASA performed testing to evaluate the efficacy of fire containment boxes without forced 
ventilation. Configurational flammability testing was performed on a simulation avionics box 
replicating critical design features and filled with materials possessing representative 
flammability characteristics. This paper discusses the box’s ability, under simulated end-use 
conditions, to inhibit the propagation of combustion to surrounding materials. Analysis was also 
performed to evaluate the potential for the fire containment box to serve as an overheat/ignition 
source to temperature sensitive equipment (such as items with lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries) as 
well as to evaluate general flame propagation potential to nearby flammable materials. 
Unrealistically severe combustion scenarios were used as a means to better understand the fire 
containment mechanism. These scenarios were achieved by utilizing materials/fuels not typically 
used in space vehicles due to flammability concerns.  
 
Simulated Avionics Box Test Methodology 
 
NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) routinely performs NASA Standard 6001 Upward 
Propagation (Test 1) to qualify prospective materials, with respect to flammability, for final use 
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on spacecraft. NASA Standard Test 1 evaluates a material’s ability to self-extinguish a flame 
within a 6-in. vertical burn path for a given pressure and oxygen concentration [1]. Open flame 
ignition is initiated by the application of an electrical current to a helically formed bare 20 gauge 
nickel chromium wire wound around a chemical igniter, which in turn applies an open flame of 
known energy output to the sample for approximately 25 seconds. Radiant heat ignition utilizes 
the same electrical circuit but omits the NASA-STD-6001 igniter. 
     This upward propagation test methodology provided the perfect test bed for simulating a 
combustion event within an avionics box. Precise placement of an overwhelming ignition source 
provided control over which materials were ignited. Temperature measurements could be 
obtained at key locations to verify ignition of test materials and offer insight into the method of 
extinguishment as well as the overheat potential of the enclosure. Flammable poly methyl-
methacrylate (PMMA) witness plates were placed above the enclosure feed-through holes to 
evaluate the propensity of escaping flames to ignite nearby materials. All testing was performed 
within a 1.4 m3 (50 ft3) flammability chamber.  
 
Scope of Testing 
 
The objective of this test was to mimic a fire occurring in an avionics box in the projected 
conditions present on future spacecraft. Testing was performed to assess the potential for breach 
of enclosure (the avionics box) in the event of a fire within the enclosure, assuming normal 
operating conditions. Not only was the test article evaluated, but also the general containment 
approach was evaluated as a tool for inhibiting fire propagation both directly and as a potential 
overheat ignition source. All testing was performed in worst-case planned end use environmental 
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conditions of 40 percent oxygen and 101.3 kPa (14.7 psia) pressure. Pressure and oxygen 
concentration were achieved by first pulling vacuum on the test chamber, followed by backfilling 
the pre-mixed gas to ensure uniform oxygen concentrations throughout, including within the 
simulation avionics box. Approximately 15 min elapsed between achieving the test atmosphere 
and onset of testing to ensure adequate mixing of gases and ‘soaking’ of any porous materials 
prior to testing.  
     Testing was divided into two portions: 1) realistic simulation of current ISS avionics box 
configuration, and 2) creation of unrealistically severe combustion events. Both scenarios 
utilized the same simulation enclosure.  
 
Test Article 
 
Instead of using an actual avionics box, a simplified model consisting of a welded 
6016 aluminum box was constructed and used as the test article. All box design parameters were 
intended to emulate worst-case flammability conditions on current avionics box designs to 
ensure testing appropriately modeled worst-case heat transfer, flame escape, and propagation to 
adjacent material. To best represent end use configuration, the lid was bolted to the enclosure 
using a bolt spacing of less than 31.75 mm (1.25 in.). The model avionics box used a 
representative volume of 15.14 L (923.4 in3). The base had a length and width of 24 by 24 cm 
(9 by 9 in.), with a height of 29 cm (11.4 in.). For current avionics box designs, the worst-case 
(thinnest cross-section) wall thickness is 0.38 cm (0.150 in.). This test used a conservative wall 
thickness of ~0.25 cm (0.1 in.). The thinner wall thickness allowed conservative modeling of 
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surface temperatures. Surface temperature modeling was used to estimate the potential for heat 
generated within the box to serve as an ignition source to adjacent materials.  
     An important facet to testing was to assess any flames that could potentially escape the box 
and propagate to surrounding materials. Printed circuit board (PCB) internal pass-through 
connector slots and vents were identified as potential flame escape pathways and were included 
in the representative avionics box test model. Slots were cut into the lid of the avionics box to 
allow PCB internal pass-through connectors to protrude through the enclosure. To ensure the test 
was conservative, the pass-through connectors were not sealed, to allow respiration of the box 
due to pressure fluctuations caused by combustion. All tests were performed with the enclosure 
cover facing upward to promote combustion and exploit buoyancy in 1 g conditions by utilizing 
the PCB internal pass-through connector portholes. Flammable materials (PMMA) were placed 
above the box to evaluate whether any escaped flames could induce ignition and propagation. 
Upward orientation was chosen as a worst-case condition with respect to flame escape scenarios.  
     A simplified vent fixture utilizing a “tortuous path” for venting gas was implemented to 
emulate flight conditions without overcomplicating fabrication or assembly. A vent assembly 
was located on the side of the box to model planned use configuration with machined windows 
similar to flight models. The avionics box test article is shown in Fig. 1.  
     Three surface mount thermocouples acquired temperature data to assess the heat damage 
potential of a combustion event occurring within an avionics box. One thermocouple was located 
on the outside cover directly above the ignition source, and the other two thermocouples were 
located on the inner and outer surfaces of the vent fixture. 
 
Realistic Simulation Test Parameters 
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Simulation testing entailed use of representative end-use materials (wiring, circuit boards, 
insulation material, etc.). Added severity was achieved by the use of materials known to be more 
flammable than anticipated flight materials.  
     Six rows of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Arathane®1-coated PCBs were bolted to the lid 
of the test box to mimic a flight array. Seven lengths of 20-strand 20-gauge 
polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) coated silver-clad copper wires were restrained within the 
avionics box by four silicone-clad stainless steel P-clamps located 2.5 cm (1 in.) apart to mimic 
planned spacing in future box designs. The PTFE wire bundle was woven through the PCBs to 
provide a propagation path. Six nylon zip ties held the wires together, spaced 5.1 cm (2 in.) apart 
on wires to serve as fuel within the enclosure (Fig. 2). Nylon and PTFE are typical materials 
used in flight configuration and therefore represent a realistic scenario. 
     A 91 by 7.6 cm (36 by 3 in.) polyvinylchloride (PVC) ribbon cable was woven through the 
PCBs to create a realistic configuration and provide fuel within the enclosure. Per maximum 
oxygen concentration (MOC), use of the more flammable PVC is conservative over the 
polyimide material normally used in flight configurations (MOCPVC ~ 40%; MOCPolyimide ~ 
>99%) [2,3]. Commercial off-the-shelf items that included mezzanine connectors were used for 
PVC cable. Figure 2 shows the final placement of materials attached to the interior of the 
enclosure. Components are labeled as follows: 1) vent fixture; 2) nylon tie wrap; 3) PTFE wire 
strands, and 4) P-clamps. 
     Finally, four 1.6 by 15.2 by 6.4 cm (0.625 by 6 by 2.5 in.) blocks of highly flammable 
polyurethane foam (MOC = 19%) [4] were placed between some of the PCBs to add 
conservatism to the test. Commercial off-the-shelf PCB internal pass-through connectors were 
                                                 
1  Arathane® is a registered trademark of Ciba-Geigy Corporation, Tarrytown, New York. 
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used for testing (Fig. 3). As a COTS item, PCB internal pass-through connectors were thought to 
be made of phthalate; however, chemical verification was not performed. The connectors were 
located on the lid of the enclosure without sealing, to allow for gas exchange.  
     Figure 4 shows the final placement of materials within the enclosure. Each component is 
labeled as follows: 1) realistic igniter position 1; 2) realistic igniter position 2; 3) COTS ribbon 
cable mezzanine connectors; 4) COTS PVC ribbon cable; 5) polyurethane foam slabs; and 6) 
COTS Arathane-coated PCB. 
     Tests performed using realistic materials were ignited with NASA-STD-6001 Flammability 
Test 1 standard chemical igniters [1]. Igniters were located ~0.64 cm (0.25 in.) below the bottom 
edges of the materials chosen as ignition points. Figure 4 shows the positioning of the two igniter 
coils. Test 1 and Test 2 are indicated by igniter positions 1 and 2, respectively. Test 1 of the 
realistic scenario tests was ignited 0.64 cm (0.25 in.) below a ribbon cable connector. Test 2 of 
the realistic scenario tests was ignited 0.64 cm (0.25 in.) below two of the polyurethane foam 
blocks. Figure 4 shows the final placement of all materials within the enclosure just prior to 
attaching the lid. 
     No fans were used inside the modeled avionics box. Current avionics box designs use heat 
exchangers for cooling.  
 
Unrealistically Severe Test Parameters 
 
The unrealistically severe scenario utilized the highly flammable polyurethane foam as a fuel and 
nothing more. The PCBs were stripped of the mounting surfaces, and copper mounting fixtures 
were used to attach the foam blocks to the avionics box (Fig. 5). These blocks were mounted to 
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the avionics box directly under the PCB internal pass-through connectors, which were left on the 
test article to obtain a direct comparison between realistic and worst-case test scenarios with 
respect to leak paths and flame escape routes.  
     Testing was performed with two packing densities: 60 and 80 percent free volume. The free-
volume density was achieved by varying the width of the polyurethane foam blocks. For these 
tests, the gas contained within the foam itself was disregarded and the volume of the foam was 
calculated by simply multiplying the three geometric dimensions. Gaps were purposely left 
between rows of foam to encourage propagation. 
     Because of the numerous chemical igniters needed to ignite the various foam blocks 
simultaneously, concerns with respect to oxygen consumption arose. These concerns led to the 
use of hot-wire igniters for the foam worst-case scenario testing. Ignition of the foam blocks was 
obtained by supplying an electrical current to six helically wound 20 gauge nickel chromium 
wires ~2.5 cm (1 in.) across. Each of these six igniter coils made contact with two of the foam 
blocks to ensure ignition. Figure 6 shows the positioning of the six igniter coils at the bottom of 
the enclosure. 
 
Test Results 
 
Ignition of materials within the simulation avionics box was verified prior to the performance of 
any in-depth posttest analysis. Table 1 displays the pre- and posttest oxygen and carbon dioxide 
concentrations within the test chamber. Pre- and posttest mass quantities represent the sum of all 
available flammable material within the avionics box. Secondary verification of ignition and 
combustion was observed using test videos. Smoke emanating from the enclosure confirmed 
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combustion occurring within the container. Peak temperatures were consistently measured at the 
thermocouple located on the avionics box cover directly above the ignition points. 
     Ignition of the first realistic scenario test was initiated beneath the ribbon cable mezzanine 
connector. Combustion propagated to the ribbon cable, P-clamp/PTFE-coated wire bundle, and 
the foam blocks directly above the ignition source. The foam blocks located on the opposite end 
of the enclosure were not involved in this combustion event. Peak surface avionics box cover 
temperature was measured at 68 °C (155 °F). Smoke was seen emanating from the test enclosure 
via test video.  
     The second realistic scenario yielded similar results. Combustion was initiated at the foam 
blocks, and propagation proceeded halfway up the blocks and quickly extinguished. Peak 
avionics box cover temperatures were recorded at approximately 66 °C (150 °F). Smoke was 
observed escaping the enclosure through the pass-through holes; however, no flames were 
observed.  
     For the two unrealistically severe scenarios, self-extinguishment of the foam blocks used to 
create the 60 and 80 percent free-volume tests occurred despite ignition of each of the blocks. 
Propagation did not even extend the entire length of the foam blocks. Clean, uncharred surfaces 
remained post free-volume tests. Peak temperatures recorded at the avionics box lid were 52 °C 
(125 °F) and 104 °C (220 °F) for 60 and 80 percent free volume, respectively. In both cases, 
peak temperatures lasted less than 2 s. The higher temperatures obtained in these last two 
scenarios indicate that the initial increased free volume, and therefore an increased amount of 
available oxygen at the time of ignition, resulted in the most severe scenario observed during this 
evaluation. Despite the severe test conditions, self-extinguishment of the test material was 
observed.  
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Conclusions 
 
Configurational flammability testing performed on a simulation avionics box yielded results 
unique to this type of assembly that may also be considered as a potential strategy for isolating 
other possible flammable materials and components in spacecraft vehicles. Analysis was 
performed to evaluate the potential for the fire containment box to serve as an overheat/ignition 
source to temperature sensitive equipment (such as items with Li-Ion batteries) as well as the 
ability of escaping flames to propagate to nearby materials. Unrealistically severe combustion 
scenarios were also used as a means to better understand the fire containment mechanism. 
Oxygen depletion, during combustion within the fire containment boxes, drove 
self-extinguishment and proved an effective method of fire containment. 
     In all test scenarios, realistic as well as unrealistically severe polyurethane foam testing, self-
extinguishment of materials was observed. As polyurethane is known to be highly flammable at 
the 40 percent oxygen and 101.3 kPa (14.7 psia) test conditions [4], it is particularly noteworthy 
that in all tests polyurethane at some point ignited and self-extinguished. Premixed gas was 
supplied to the test chamber after pulling vacuum, guaranteeing the interior of the box had fully 
mixed 40 percent oxygen available at the initiation of the test. It is believed that, in all cases, 
self-extinguishment is due to oxygen depletion occurring inside the avionics box as a result of 
combustion. Though the simulation avionics box was not hermetically sealed and various known 
leak paths existed, it was shown that positive pressure due to gas expansion and combustion 
products inhibits fresh oxygen from replenishing the constrained volume until 
self-extinguishment occurs.  
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     Although smoke was observed exiting the avionics box from around the PCB internal 
pass-through connector interfaces, no flames were observed; therefore, no direct propagation 
risks to nearby materials were noted. Surface temperature data were analyzed to assess the 
potential of the avionics box serving as an overheat source to surrounding temperature-sensitive 
equipment (such as items with Li-Ion batteries). The highest temperature obtained for any of the 
tests was 104 °C (220 °F), and it was only sustained for a couple of seconds before 
self-extinguishment occurred, after which temperatures quickly dropped. Since this short-lived 
high temperature was obtained with an unrealistically high 80-percent free volume resulting in a 
significantly higher quantity of oxygen available for combustion, these conditions are unlikely to 
occur in actual use conditions. Maximum temperatures obtained, coupled with short duration 
temperature increases, indicate an avionics box or similar fire containment box is not a likely 
overheat ignition source for nearby temperature sensitive equipment.  
     It should be noted that all of the testing and results presented here were performed for 
containment boxes without forced air convection. These data should not be applied to units 
containing forced air convection. Additional testing would need to be performed to assess 
flammability risks of similar systems with the use of forced air convection. 
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FIG. 1—Avionics box - vents and PCBs. 
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FIG. 2—Inside of simulation avionics box, showing 1) vent fixture; 2) nylon tie wrap; 3) PTFE 
wire strands; and 4) P-clamps. 
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FIG. 3—Avionics box lid with PCB internal pass-through connectors. 
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FIG. 4—Simulation avionics box test materials final placement, including 1) realistic igniter 
position 1; 2) realistic igniter position 2; 3) COTS ribbon cable mezzanine connectors; 4) COTS 
PVC ribbon cable; 5) polyurethane foam slabs; and 6) COTS Arathane-coated PCB. 
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FIG. 5—Mounted polyurethane foam. 
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FIG 6—Hot wire igniter fixture showing placement of the six igniter coils. 
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Table 1—Pre- and posttest oxygen and carbon dioxide concentrations and mass of materials. 
 Pretest Posttest Posttest Deltas 
 O2  
(% vol.) 
Mass  
(grams) 
CO2  
(% vol.) 
O2  
(% vol.) 
Mass  
(grams) 
CO2  
(% vol.) 
O2  
(% vol.) 
Mass  
(grams) 
CO2  
(% vol.) 
Realistic Scenario 1 40.10 246.66 0.00 39.90 240.89 0.08 -0.20 -5.77 0.08 
Realistic Scenario 2 40.15 240.89 0.00 40.02 234.04 0.08 -0.13 -6.85 0.08 
60 Percent Free 
Volume 
40.30 189.63 0.00 40.10 185.92 0.08 -0.20 -3.71 0.08 
80 Percent Free 
Volume 
40.30 96.89 0.00 40.10 92.03 0.08 -0.20 -4.86 0.08 
 
